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Abstract  
We analyse the causal effect of job loss on disability insurance enrolment on a five-year 
horizon and the implications on health expenditures. Using individual level administrative 
panel data from Hungary, we follow individuals displaced due to a mass lay-off and compare 
their labour force status to non-laid-off individuals with similar employment and health 
history, chosen with propensity score matching. According to our estimates, being laid off 
increases the transition probability to disability by 50% (or 1.4% points) in four years, and 
half of the excess transitions occur within the first year. We find a greater than average effect 
among older individuals and those who were in worse health before.  
Outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical expenditure increases 3.5−4 times when a laid-off 
individual takes up disability benefit, and decreases slightly afterwards, but does not reach 
the pre-disability levels. This health expenditure pattern resembles that observed around the 
diagnosis of previously undetected chronic diseases, such as diabetes or hypertension, but 
genuine health shocks may also be present. The increase in health expenditure corresponds 
to 20-25% of the additional disability payments in the medium term. 
JEL: C23, I12, I38, J63 
Keywords: administrative panel data, disability insurance, displacement, health 
expenditures 
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Állásvesztés, rokkantnyugdíj és egészségügyi kiadások  
Bíró Anikó – Elek Péter 
 
Összefoglaló 
Ötéves időtávon vizsgáljuk az állásvesztés rokkantnyugdíjazásra kifejtett hatását és 
összefüggését az egészségügyi kiadásokkal. Magyarországi egyéni szintű adminisztratív 
paneladatokat használva követjük a csoportos létszámleépítések keretében elbocsátott 
munkavállalókat, és hozzájuk munkapiaci és egészségügyi előtörténetben hasonló, ám nem 
elbocsátott dolgozókat párosítunk propensity score alapú eljárással. Becslésünk szerint az 
elbocsátás 50%-kal (illetve 1,4 százalékponttal) növeli a rokkantnyugdíjazás valószínűségét 
négy év alatt. A rokkantnyugdíjazási többlet mintegy fele az elbocsátás utáni első évben 
jelentkezik. Átlagosnál erősebb hatást mérünk az idősebbek és a korábban rosszabb egészségi 
állapottal rendelkezők körében. 
Az elbocsátottak járóbeteg-, fekvőbeteg- és gyógyszerkiadásai 3,5–4-szeresükre emelkednek a 
rokkantnyugdíjazáskor, és enyhén csökkennek utána, de nem érik el a kiindulási értékeiket. 
Ez a kiadási mintázat hasonlít a krónikus betegségek, például a diabétesz vagy a magas 
vérnyomás diagnózisakor megfigyelhető mintázathoz, de nem zárható ki tényleges 
egészségügyi sokkok jelenléte sem. Középtávon az egészségügyi kiadások növekedése a 
megnövekedett rokkantnyugdíj-kifizetések 20-25%-át teszi ki. 
JEL: C23, I12, I38, J63 
Tárgyszavak: adminisztratív paneladatok, rokkantnyugdíj, elbocsátás, egészségügyi 
kiadások 
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five-year horizon and the implications on health expenditures. Using individual level
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Outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical expenditure increases 3.5−4 times when
a laid-off individual takes up disability benefit, and decreases slightly afterwards, but
does not reach the pre-disability levels. This health expenditure pattern resembles
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1 Introduction and related literature
The aims of this paper are twofold: to estimate the extent to which displaced workers
substitute non-employment with participation in social programmes for the disabled, and
to estimate the implications of the transition to disability benefit status due to job loss on
health expenditures.
The high share of working-age individuals receiving disability benefits is a major social
and economic problem in many developed countries. Liebman [2015] documents a substantial
increase in the share of disability insurance recipients within the working-age population in
the United States, rising from 2.2% in the late 1970s to 4.6% in 2013. Banks et al. [2015]
report for Great Britain that the number of disability recipients more than doubled from
the 1970s to 2013. According to OECD statistics, 5.6% of the working age population in
OECD countries received disability benefits in 2007 (the middle of our examined period),
with much higher than average rates in Hungary (12%), Sweden, Norway, Finland and the
Netherlands (8 − 11%) (OECD, 2009, Figure 4.1). To make the problem more severe, very
few recipients of disability benefits return to the labour market.
Consequences on government expenditures are substantial. According to Eurostat, spend-
ing on disability benefits amounted to 1.9% of GDP in the European Union (EU27) in 2007, of
which 1.4% were cash benefits and 0.9% of GDP was disability pension. In most OECD coun-
tries these expenditures are much larger than expenditures on any other income-replacement
programme for working-age individuals [OECD, 2009]. It is, thus, of great policy importance
to understand and potentially reduce the employment-related channels of disability claims.
Such reductions can not only increase the employment rate of the working-age population,
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but can also have beneficial effects on the public health care budget – a previously undocu-
mented aspect, which is the focus of our analysis.
We know from previous literature that job loss has a lasting negative effect on future
labour market position (Bo¨heim and Taylor, 2002, Eliason and Storrie, 2006) and a particu-
larly scarring effect on consecutive earnings (Arulampalam, 2001, Gregory and Jukes, 2001,
Jacobson et al., 1993, Ruhm, 1991; among many others), but less is known about its effects
on the uptake of social security benefits.
If eligible, a displaced worker can claim unemployment benefits. However, once the
benefit period expires, the individual either has to return to work or needs to secure other
social security benefits so as to receive some income and maintain social insurance status.
Therefore, job loss might influence labour force status through the disability channel. As
Autor and Duggan [2003] pointed out, the characteristics of the disability insurance system
influence the propensity of labour force exit for workers who faced adverse shocks. The more
generous the disability benefit, the more likely it is for workers to exit the labour market.
In line with the results of Autor and Duggan [2003], Rege et al. [2009] and Bratsberg et al.
[2013] show evidence from Norway that job loss significantly increases the risk of disability
benefit uptake. Looking at the period of the Great Recession, both Maestas et al. [2015]
and Jime´nez-Mart´ın et al. [2018] find that the recession had an increasing effect on disability
applications, but due to the increased rate of denials, there is no clear effect on the stock of
disability benefit recipients. Scharle [2008] shows on county-level data in Hungary that local
labour market conditions are correlated with disability insurance claims.
Our first aim in this paper is to estimate the causal effect of job loss on disability insurance
enrolment using individual-level administrative data from Hungary between 2003 and 2011.
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To overcome the endogeneity of job loss, we exploit mass lay-offs and match laid-off to non-
laid-off workers with propensity score matching. We then follow individuals in the matched
sample and obtain that job loss implies a 50% (or 1.4% points) higher transition to disability
insurance in four years. Half of the excess transitions occur within the first year, and the
transition probability returns to the value in the control group after about three years.
Obviously, the increased transition to disability after a job loss may not only be a re-
sult of the altered labour market behaviour described above, but may also stem from gen-
uine health shocks associated with unemployment. Disentangling the two channels is not
straightforward, even if data on healthcare use or health expenditures is available, because
non-employment may affect the demand for health services through various pathways.
First, unemployment and inactivity may have direct health effects, although the literature
on it is mixed (see e.g. Browning et al., 2006 and Schmitz, 2011 for non-significant results;
Schaller and Stevens, 2015 for negative average effects and Schiele and Schmitz, 2016 for
negative effects on those in initial bad health). Second, even if health status is constant,
non-employment may reduce health care use because of the decreased incentives for health
maintenance and possibly because of a change in insurance status. Kuhn et al. [2009] and
Schaller and Stevens [2015] find little evidence for an effect of job loss on healthcare use.
However, Schaller and Stevens [2015] find that doctoral visits and prescription drug usage
decrease if the lost job was the primary source of insurance.
In particular, the application for and maintenance of disability benefit may have pro-
found, time-varying impact on healthcare use. At the time of the application, healthcare use
may increase because of the expanded incentives for being diagnosed with various chronic
conditions, and also because of the need to check health status during the review process.
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Afterwards, receiving disability benefit may reduce incentives for health maintenance, thus
lowering healthcare use.
We are not familiar with studies in the literature that would analyse the relationship
between health expenditures – a measure of healthcare use – and the uptake of disability
benefits due to job loss. This is the second aim of our paper.
According to our results, claiming disability benefit after being laid off is associated with
a 3.5−4-fold surge in health expenditure. Although the expenditure declines after the uptake
of the benefit, it does not reach its pre-disability levels. We do not observe specific health
conditions in our database, but in other individual-level administrative datasets we find that
the diagnosis of chronic diseases, such as diabetes or hypertension, is associated with similar
patterns of health expenditure, although with a somewhat smaller (two-fold – three-fold)
surge. Overall, the results suggest that the surge in health expenditure around the uptake of
disability benefit is due mostly to the diagnosis of chronic diseases, although genuine health
shocks may also be present.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Disability and unemployment benefits
The following brief summary of the disability insurance system in Hungary is based on
MISSOC [2018], OECD [2012] and Scharle [2011].
Disability insurance in its current form was introduced in 1983. As part of the social
security system, disability benefits are paid from the public budget. During the first part of
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the analysed period (up to 2008), people with at least 67% incapacity for work could apply
for disability pension. The amount of the benefit was influenced by the average wage before
disability, the incapacity ratio and the length of the insurance period. The replacement rate
typically varied between 40 − 65%. Eligibility terminated if the pensioner was no longer
incapable of work, or worked on a regular basis, earning an income comparable to what
could have been earned in the specific occupation prior to becoming disabled. The evaluation
of claims was rather generous. However, as public spending on disability benefits steadily
increased, governments began to acknowledge the need for reform. As a result, rehabilitation
allowance was introduced in 2008. It is paid to a person with a required number of service
years who suffers from 50 − 79% damage to health (comparable to the 67% incapacity for
work in the previous system), is unable to pursue a former job but is capable of rehabilitation.
It is 20% more generous than the disability pension but may be paid only for the necessary
period of rehabilitation and for a maximum of three years. Recipients of the allowance have
to participate in a comprehensive rehabilitation plan devised by the employment office with
a view to recover their work capacity. Those who suffer from at least 50% damage to health,
but for whom rehabilitation is not proposed, can apply for disability pension. Our data does
not allow us to distinguish between these types of benefits, so we will examine them jointly
under the name of ‘disability benefit’.
An application for disability benefit is evaluated by a committee, which considers the
social circumstances of the applicant as well as the medical evidence for disability. Thus to
prove eligibility, the applicant has to contact physicians to request medical certificates. A
similar process exists for the review of eligibility, which occurs every 1 − 5 years (depend-
ing on the condition of the applicant). This implies that the application for and review of
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disability both increase health expenditure. In the analysed period, the approval rate of dis-
ability insurance applications was around 30% [Central Administration of National Pension
Insurance, 2018].
The system of disability insurance was again reformed in 2011, mostly due to the high
public payments on disability benefits and to the alleged widespread abuse of the system.
The new, stricter legislation came into effect in 2012, which is outside our observation period.
Since then, disability benefits are no longer considered to be part of the pension system, but
rather as a type of sickness allowance.
A major risk of the system is that, despite the screening of applicants for disability
benefits, individuals might still use them as a substitute of unemployment benefits. Over
the analysed period (between 2003–2011), Hungary had a two-tier unemployment insurance
scheme. Unemployment benefit in the first tier depended on the income the year before
unemployment, and could be received for, at most, 270 days. After the exhaustion of the
first tier of unemployment benefits, the unemployed could receive a flat amount of unem-
ployment assistance for an additional 3 months. Afterwards, low-income individuals could
claim welfare benefits.
2.2 Healthcare system
The Hungarian healthcare system is a single-payer system, where services are financed from
contributions and state subsidies, administered by the National Health Insurance Fund Ad-
ministration (NHIFA). The vast majority of individuals – the employees, the unemployed,
the pensioners and those on various benefits – are automatically insured (in the case of em-
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ployees, the employers are obliged to pay the social insurance contributions for them). So
as to remain insured, inactive people not belonging to any of the previous categories have
to pay a monthly fee for health insurance coverage: however, those with low income are still
exempt from the payment of the fee.
The majority of healthcare services, including both outpatient and inpatient care, do not
require co-payments, although informal payments are common for a wide range of services.
People may opt for using private care (which was common only in certain specialties; e.g.
in dental care or gynecology, during the examined period) when they have to pay fee for
the services. User fees for medication depend on the amount of subsidies from the NHIFA,
which varies greatly across substances. On average, patients have to cover slightly less than
half of the price of a medication: the rest is paid by the social security. A more detailed
overview of Hungary’s healthcare system is provided by Gaa´l et al. [2011].
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a unique administrative panel dataset from Hungary. The
data covers a random half of the 5− 74 years-old population in 2003, who were followed-up
until 2011. It was created by linking administrative data from the Hungarian tax authority,
the pension and the health authorities, among others.1 In this research, we concentrate on
the 35 − 54 years-old age group, which includes most of the transitions to disability, but
excludes the vast majority of old-age pensioners.
1The linked dataset is under the ownership of the Central Administration of National Pension Insurance,
the National Health Insurance Fund Administration, the Educational Authority, the National Tax and
Customs Administration, the National Labour Office, and the Pension Payment Directorate of Hungary.
The data was processed by the Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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We use various segments of the dataset. Gender, year of birth and settlement of residence
(corresponding to year 2003) are recorded for each individual. The labour market and benefit
segment contains monthly information on wages, employment, pension and other benefit
status. Therefore, we can track on a monthly basis whether an individual was employed,
was a pensioner or received unemployment, disability or other benefits. Occupation (ISCO)
codes of employment spells are collected for employees (but not for the self-employed). Level
of education is not observed but can be approximated for each occupation code (and thus
for each individual) as the median education level of workers with the same occupation in
the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
The dataset contains firm-level information on employers (such as private or public),
and employees of the same firm can be identified. In particular, the size of the firm can be
approximated as twice the number of its employees in the sample, although this estimate is
not very accurate for micro-firms.
Figure 1 shows the rates of the most important benefits by gender and age. The employ-
ment rate (not shown in the figure) is 60 − 70% for males of the examined ages. Because
of maternity, employment rate reaches 60% only among women aged above 35. The ratio
of disability benefit recipients increases heavily with age and goes above 10% among those
aged 50 and above, while unemployment benefit is received by around 5% of the population
at all examined ages. The ratio of old-age pensioners (not shown) is below 3%, even among
those aged 50− 54.
Health expenditures are observed on the annual level in the dataset. We have information
on the annual public expenditures on specialist outpatient care and inpatient care, and on the
annual public plus private (out-of-pocket, OOP) expenditures on prescribed pharmaceuticals.
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Figure 1: Rates of some benefits by gender and age group
Altogether, we track around 60% of total healthcare expenditure in Hungary. The most
important excluded items are services provided by general practitioners (GP), and OOP
payments on non-prescribed medications and on medical services. Although GP care is not
covered by our data, total outpatient care expenditures are reasonably well captured because
of the high usage of outpatient specialist care in Hungary (see Elek et al., 2015).
In the main analysis, we will follow the labour market outcomes of those affected by mass
lay-off, which we consider as an involuntary job loss. An event is classified as a mass lay-off
if the size of the company decreases by at least 30% and remains, at most, at 70% of the
original size during the following year. This definition includes company closures as well.
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Since the size of micro-firms cannot be determined precisely, due to the 50% sample at our
disposal, we examine only the mass lay-offs of companies with at least five employees in the
sample (i.e. at least ten employees on average). We exclude those observations concerning
mass lay-offs where the firm size decreases by more than 30%, but more than 15% of the
employees move to the same employer. In Appendix C, we use two alternative definitions of
job loss – company closure (including early leavers) and the official definition of collective
redundancy in Hungary. We show that the main results are qualitatively robust to the
alternative definitions.
4 Methods
4.1 Mass lay-off and disability benefits
We examine the medium-term effect of involuntary job loss on taking up disability benefits.
We compare disability insurance enrolment of laid-off workers to those non-laid-off workers
who were similar in their measured characteristics at the time of lay-off. Similarity is defined
in terms of the variables of Table 1, which contains calendar time, individual demographic
characteristics (gender, age, region, settlement type), characteristics of the current job (firm
size, occupation2), history of labour market and benefit status in the last 24 months, history
of health expenditures and sick leave in the last two calendar years (but not including the
current year) and the change in size of the employee’s firm in the last two years.
We perform 1:1 nearest neighbour propensity score matching, using a logit model with the
above variables. Following, for example, Austin [2011], a caliper of 0.2 standard deviation of
2A detailed occupational (ISCO-based) classification with 34 items, not shown in the Table, is used.
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the logit score is enforced to exclude matches that are far from a laid-off worker in treatment
propensity.3 Exact matching is conducted on gender and monthly date, and matching is
performed without replacement on the individual basis; i.e. if a person is chosen in the
control group, then she/he will not be chosen again at a later date. The last column of
Table 1 shows that the laid-off and the matched control sample are sufficiently similar to
each other with respect to the examined variables, the standardized differences4 being below
7% (0.07) in all cases, less than the 0.10 difference treated as an appropriate balance in
propensity score studies (e.g. Austin, 2009). Figure A1 in the Appendix also confirms that
the estimated propensity scores are balanced in the treatment (lay-off) and the matched
control group.
We follow both the stock of disability benefit recipients and the transition rate to dis-
ability in the matched laid-off vs. control groups. Let t = 0 denote the time of inclusion
into the sample.5 We first compare the probabilities of receiving disability benefit in the two
groups at t = 24 and t = 48 months, respectively. Then, to measure heterogenous lay-off
effects, we estimate linear probability models where the lay-off dummy is interacted with
individual characteristics such as gender, level of education, age group, region specific unem-
ployment rate (measured at t = 0) and – to capture baseline health status – the dummy for
hospitalization in the last year before t = 0. Third, we compare the three-month transition
probabilities to disability in the two groups at each quarter before t = 60 months.
3This adjustment affects only 4% of the treated sample; hence Table 1 does not display descriptive
statistics separately on the laid-off and the matched laid-off sample.
4The standardized difference is obtained by dividing the mean difference with the standard deviation of
the variables. The latter is approximated as the square root of the average of the two individual variances.
5Hence t = 0 denotes the time of lay-off in the treated group. In the control group it does not correspond
to a particular event but only indicates a time point when the history of the control person is very similar
to her/his matched treated counterpart.
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4.2 Health expenditures
We investigate the time pattern of health expenditures of displaced workers who became
disabled 1 − 12; 13 − 24; 25 − 36 or 37 − 48 months after the job loss. Due to the non-
negligible fraction of zero expenditures (i.e. of not using the given category of healthcare at
all in a given year) and to the high skewness of the expenditure distributions, we analyse the
probability of positive (non-zero) expenditures and the logarithm of the positive expenditures
separately, in a two-part (hurdle) model setting, for three expenditure categories (outpatient,
inpatient and prescribed pharmaceutical expenditures).
First, we compare the time patterns to a control group, which consists of the matched
(1:1) control pairs of those laid-off workers who later became disabled. This way, we can
identify the dynamics of health expenditure shocks that eventually lead to disablement.
Second, we conduct an event study analysis. We regress, in a fixed-effects setting, the
annual health expenditure measures on the years elapsed since (or before) the uptake of
disability benefit within the sample of laid-off individuals receiving disability benefit:
his = η0 +
∑
k 6=0
ηkD
(k)
is + ci + ξs + uis, (1)
where i denotes the individual, s the calendar time in years, his is the indicator of health
expenditures (binary indicator of positive expenditures or the logarithmic value of positive
expenditures), D
(k)
is (−2 ≤ k ≤ 3) is the time (in years) after or before the uptake of disability
benefit, ξs is the calendar year fixed effect, ci captures individual fixed effects (controlling
for all time-invariant individual characteristics such as gender or initial health status) and
uis denotes the error term. The parameters ηk are of main interest.
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5 Results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Tables 1 displays descriptive statistics for different subsamples. The first columns refer to
the general employed population and the second columns to workers displaced in mass lay-
offs, at the time of their (first) lay-off. The samples are restricted to those aged 35 − 54
years, who were continuously employed in the last six months, and – to comply with the
mass lay-off definition – were employed by a firm with at least ten (estimated) employees.
We concentrate on years between 2005−2009 to ensure that we have a two-year long history
and also a two-year long follow-up period for each individual. Altogether we examine 28,169
laid-off workers, out of the approximately 1 million workers of the 35–54-years old cohort.
According to Table 1, mass lay-offs peaked during the financial crisis in 2008− 2009, and
affected males, the lower educated and the employees of smaller firms disproportionately
more often. Furthermore, laid-off workers earned one third less and spent one month less in
employment, 0.3 month more in unemployment and 0.9 day more on sick leave in the 13−24
months preceding their displacement than the general employed population. On the other
hand, the two-year health expenditure history is not particularly different in the laid-off and
in the general working population, as measured by outpatient, inpatient and pharmaceutical
expenditure percentiles. These percentiles were calculated according to the (five-year) age
group- and gender-specific expenditure distributions (covering workers and non-workers as
well).6
6The average inpatient percentile is around 10 for both groups because of the low rate of hospitalisation.
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Employed Mass lay-off Control Stand.
(matched) (matched) difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (matched)
Year
2005 0.202 0.402 0.173 0.378 0.173 0.378 0.0%
2006 0.201 0.401 0.161 0.367 0.161 0.367 0.0%
2007 0.202 0.402 0.152 0.359 0.152 0.359 0.0%
2008 0.201 0.401 0.253 0.435 0.253 0.435 0.0%
2009 0.193 0.395 0.261 0.439 0.261 0.439 0.0%
Male 0.464 0.499 0.538 0.499 0.538 0.499 0.0%
Age group
35-39 0.247 0.431 0.257 0.437 0.261 0.439 −0.9%
40-44 0.232 0.422 0.231 0.422 0.229 0.420 0.5%
45-49 0.244 0.429 0.237 0.425 0.236 0.425 0.2%
50-54 0.277 0.448 0.275 0.446 0.274 0.446 0.2%
Region (2003)
C Hungary 0.289 0.453 0.285 0.452 0.284 0.451 0.3%
C Transdanubia 0.127 0.332 0.130 0.337 0.128 0.334 0.7%
W Transdanubia 0.116 0.32 0.111 0.314 0.109 0.312 0.5%
S Transdanubia 0.091 0.287 0.083 0.277 0.083 0.276 0.1%
N Hungary 0.118 0.322 0.138 0.345 0.141 0.348 −0.8%
N Great Plain 0.137 0.343 0.141 0.348 0.146 0.353 −1.3%
S Great Plain 0.123 0.328 0.111 0.314 0.108 0.311 0.7%
Settlement type (2003)
Budapest 0.164 0.37 0.153 0.360 0.152 0.359 0.4%
County-level town 0.217 0.412 0.187 0.390 0.188 0.391 −0.2%
Other town 0.321 0.467 0.326 0.469 0.326 0.469 −0.1%
Village 0.298 0.457 0.334 0.472 0.334 0.472 0.0%
Estimated level of education (based on occupation)
Primary 0.140 0.347 0.207 0.405 0.206 0.405 0.2%
Lower secondary 0.377 0.485 0.544 0.498 0.543 0.498 0.2%
Upper secondary 0.276 0.447 0.172 0.378 0.173 0.378 −0.2%
Tertiary 0.207 0.405 0.077 0.267 0.078 0.268 −0.4%
Firm characteristics
Size 4811 8970 209 554 182 522 5.0%
10-24 employees 0.121 0.326 0.214 0.410 0.229 0.420 −3.7%
25-49 employees 0.079 0.269 0.183 0.387 0.196 0.397 −3.2%
50-99 employees 0.089 0.284 0.181 0.385 0.190 0.392 −2.3%
100-249 employees 0.113 0.316 0.172 0.378 0.170 0.376 0.6%
250-4999 employees 0.308 0.462 0.214 0.410 0.187 0.390 6.8%
5000- employees 0.292 0.455 0.036 0.185 0.028 0.165 4.4%
Size 1 year ago if non-missing 3831 7632 220 576 181 565 6.9%
Size 2 years ago if non-missing 3038 6454 167 479 141 516 5.2%
Size 1 year ago non-missing 0.852 0.355 0.795 0.404 0.791 0.406 1.0%
Size 2 years ago non-missing 0.727 0.445 0.595 0.491 0.572 0.495 4.6%
Government sector 0.292 0.455 0.030 0.172 0.027 0.161 2.3%
Labour market history, number of months
Employment in prev. 12 months 11.87 0.71 11.59 1.21 11.58 1.24 0.6%
Employment in prev. 13-24 months 11.36 2.21 10.31 3.50 10.18 3.66 3.7%
Disab benefit in prev. 12 months 0.003 0.14 0.007 0.22 0.005 0.20 0.6%
Disab benefit in prev. 13-24 months 0.010 0.32 0.021 0.45 0.022 0.46 −0.2%
Unemployment in prev. 12 months 0.066 0.55 0.20 0.93 0.19 0.93 1.0%
Unemployment in prev. 13-24 months 0.20 1.20 0.55 1.91 0.55 1.92 −0.4%
Maternity in prev. 12 months 0.026 0.42 0.028 0.45 0.037 0.51 −1.9%
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Employed Mass lay-off Control Stand.
(matched) (matched) difference
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. (matched)
Maternity in prev. 13-24 months 0.099 0.98 0.11 1.07 0.14 1.19 −2.6%
Total wage in prev. 13-24 months, M HUF 2.05 4.15 1.30 1.60 1.27 1.48 1.8%
Health expenditure history, gender- and age-corrected percentiles
Outpatient, 1 year ago 47.5 30.1 45.1 31.5 45.2 31.0 −0.4%
Outpatient, 2 years ago 47.5 30.0 45.0 31.2 45.0 30.8 0.1%
Inpatient, 1 year ago 9.6 26.7 9.9 27.1 10.2 27.5 −1.3%
Inpatient, 2 years ago 9.6 26.7 9.6 26.7 9.8 27.0 −0.8%
Pharma, 1 year ago 46.7 31.2 43.6 32.2 43.2 32.0 1.2%
Pharma, 2 years ago 46.6 31.3 43.5 32.2 43.1 32.0 1.1%
Days of sick-leave in prev. 13-24 months 3.9 17.0 4.8 19.6 5.3 21.8 −2.3%
Number of observations * 28,169 28,169
*: Number of individuals: 1,074,888
*: Number of person-months: 38.4− 38.9 million, depending on the variable
S.D.: standard deviation
Standardized difference: the difference of means divided by the square root of the average
of the two individual variances
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the employed, the matched mass lay-off and matched control
sample (with standardized differences between the latter two), see text for sample restrictions
Figure 2 displays the time pattern of labour force indicators of the matched laid-off vs.
control workers. The pre-trends of the two groups are identical, apart from the severance pay
effect observed in monthly wages of laid-off workers just before the lay-off. The employment
rate falls substantially at the time of mass lay-off and partly reverts afterwards, while the
unemployment rate shows the opposite pattern. Meanwhile, the stock of disability benefit
recipients increases much faster after the job loss than in the control group.
5.2 Mass lay-off and disability benefits
Table 2 displays the probability of receiving disability benefit at t = 24 and t = 48 months.
The ratio of disability benefit recipients is 2.3% in the laid-off and 1.2% in the control group
after two years, hence the difference is 1.1% points, which increases to 1.4% points after four
years. In line with these figures, a simple logit model, containing only the lay-off dummy gives
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Figure 2: Labour force indicators around the time of mass lay-off
an odds ratio of 1.97 after two years and 1.49 after four years. For the sake of comparison, we
show in Table B1 in the Appendix that mass lay-off decreases the probability of employment
by 13−17% points and increases the probability of unemployment by 3.7−5.3% points over
the two- and four-year time horizons, with no significant effect on the receipt of maternity
benefits. Job loss decreases non-zero earnings by 16 − 17% over these time spans, which is
in line with other results in the literature (Jacobson et al., 1993 and Stevens, 1997, among
others).
Looking at the linear probability model with heterogenous effects in Table 2, the in-
teraction terms of individual characteristics with mass lay-off show that job loss increases
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the probability of receiving disability benefit particularly among individuals aged 45 − 54
and among those in bad health, as measured by the dummy for hospitalisation in the year
preceding job loss. After adjusting for these differences, the interaction terms with gender,
education level and micro-regional unemployment rate – a proxy for local labour market
conditions – are statistically insignificant. These results imply that those who transit to
disability benefit after mass lay-off were, on average, in worse health already before the mass
lay-off. However, they could have continued working had the mass lay-off not occurred.
The lower panel of Table 2 displays the differences in baseline probabilities between
groups. The above interaction terms should be interpreted in light of the fact that the older,
the lower educated, those in bad health and those living in higher unemployment regions are
more likely to transition to disability in the control group. Hence, for instance, local labour
market conditions have an impact upon the transition to disability, but this impact does not
seem to vary by treatment status (i.e. by being laid-off or not).
Figure 3 shows the three-month transition probabilities to disability and their differences
in the two groups. The transition probability jumps high in the laid-off group after the expiry
of unemployment benefit (at 6− 12 months), while it increases slowly in the control group.
The difference of transition probabilities is statistically significantly positive in the first three
years and reaches zero afterwards. Overall, around half of the total excess transitions of four
years occur within the first year.
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Figure 3: Effect of mass lay-off on the three-month transition probabilities to disability, with
their difference (and the 95% confidence interval)
5.3 Health expenditures
According to Figure 4, the uptake of disability benefit is associated with raised health expen-
ditures, which decline after claiming the benefit but do not fall back to their pre-disability
levels. At the same time, we do not observe a noteworthy pattern among the matched con-
trol observations; i.e. among individuals who had similar pre-lay-off characteristics but were
not laid off.7 Similarly, there is no jump in the health expenditures of the laid-off but not
7Initially, we have four different control groups for the four different disabled samples according to the
time spent between mass lay-off and disability benefit uptake. Since the health expenditures of the four
control groups do not differ significantly, we display only their average values in Figure 4.
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disabled individuals. The lines for the latter group are consistently below those for the other
groups, since the later disabled laid-off workers are in worse health even before the lay-off.
Specifically, the figures for the binary health expenditure outcomes show that the diver-
gence between the laid-off and control groups are the strongest for the probability of positive
inpatient care expenditures (i.e. hospitalisation). Since most people realise some outpatient
and pharmaceutical expenditures irrespective of their disability status, the differences be-
tween the treatment and control groups are not that strong in these two cases, albeit still
statistically significant.
Turning to the logarithm of positive expenditures, the amount of non-zero outpatient
and pharmaceutical expenditures starts to increase substantially a couple of years before the
individual first receives disability benefit. A smaller increase is also observed for the amount
of non-zero inpatient expenditures.
21
Probabilities of receiving disability benefit
at 2 years at 4 years
in (matched) control group 0.0121 0.0290
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0236 0.0426
difference (with S.E.) 0.0114∗∗∗ (0.0012) 0.0136∗∗∗ (0.0023)
Logit model odds ratios on receving disability benefit
at 2 years at 4 years
coeff. (OR) S.E. coeff. (OR) S.E.
mass lay-off 1.971∗∗∗ (0.136) 1.492∗∗∗ (0.102)
constant 0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.002)
Linear probability models with controls and interactions
at 2 years at 4 years
coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E.
Interaction of mass lay-off with
male 0.0017 (0.0024) 0.0061 (0.0047)
age group (baseline = 35-39 years)
- 40-44 year 0.0043∗ (0.0022) −0.0034 (0.0046)
- 45-49 year 0.0069∗∗∗ (0.0026) 0.0052 (0.0055)
- 50-54 year 0.0180∗∗∗ (0.0033) 0.0288∗∗∗ (0.0062)
education (baseline = primary)
- lower secondary −0.0030 (0.0034) 0.0012 (0.0063)
- upper secondary 0.0054 (0.0039) 0.0198∗∗∗ (0.0075)
- tertiary −0.0023 (0.0043) 0.0110 (0.0089)
hospitalization in year before t = 0 0.0278∗∗∗ (0.0062) 0.0225∗∗ (0.0105)
region specific unemployment rate −0.0225 (0.0295) 0.0899 (0.1070)
constant 0.0030 (0.0039) −0.0116 (0.0090)
Main effects (differences in probabilities in the control group)
male 0.0012 (0.0014) −0.0003 (0.0030)
age group (baseline = 35-39 years)
- 40-44 year 0.0024∗ (0.0012) 0.0129∗∗∗ (0.0031)
- 45-49 year 0.0073∗∗∗ (0.0015) 0.0268∗∗∗ (0.0036)
- 50-54 year 0.0199∗∗∗ (0.0019) 0.0390∗∗∗ (0.0038)
education (baseline = primary)
- lower secondary −0.0054∗∗∗ (0.0020) −0.0129∗∗∗ (0.0044)
- upper secondary −0.0111∗∗∗ (0.0021) −0.0278∗∗∗ (0.0047)
- tertiary −0.0105∗∗∗ (0.0025) −0.0261∗∗∗ (0.0057)
hospitalization in year before t = 0 0.0228∗∗∗ (0.0035) 0.0365∗∗∗ (0.0066)
region specific unemployment rate 0.0841∗∗∗ (0.0223) 0.1773∗∗ (0.0691)
year at t = 0 (baseline = 2005)
- 2006 −0.0059∗∗∗ (0.0022) −0.0057∗∗ (0.0029)
- 2007 −0.0073∗∗∗ (0.0023) −0.0111∗∗∗ (0.0028)
- 2008 −0.0107∗∗∗ (0.0020)
- 2009 −0.0156∗∗∗ (0.0024)
constant 0.0093∗∗∗ (0.0027) 0.0135∗∗ (0.0060)
Number of observations 53,114 25,760
With standard errors (S.E.), linear probability models: robust S.E.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Effects of mass lay-off on the probability of receiving disability benefit two and four
years later
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Figure 4: Health expenditures of the laid-off, disabled workers by the time gap between the uptake of disability benefit and
mass lay-off, in the matched control group and in the laid-off but not disabled sample, with 95% confidence intervals. The
probability of positive expenditures and the logarithm of positive expenditures are displayed.
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To estimate the magnitude of the peak and the subsequent decline of health expenditures
observed in Figure 4, we report the results of the event study analysis of equation (1) in
Table 3. As for the probabilities of non-zero expenditures, the peak is the strongest for
inpatient care use (33% points in two years), but also substantial for the other two categories
(14% points). It is also noteworthy that inpatient health expenditures reach their peak the
year prior to the disability insurance enrolment. Turning to the logarithms of the positive
expenditures, the magnitude of the peak is similar for the outpatient and the pharmaceutical
categories (around 1.2 on the logarithmic scale, implying a greater than three-fold increase)
and somewhat weaker for the inpatient category (0.6 on the log scale, slightly less than
two-fold increase). If we combine the changes in logarithmic values with the changes in
probabilities (calculated at the average values), we obtain that each expenditure category
increases 3.5−4 times in the two years before disability insurance enrolment. Afterwards, all
categories of health expenditures start to decline but do not reach their pre-disability levels.
From the peak, the probability of hospitalisation falls by around 20% points, the probabilities
of the two other categories by 5 − 10% points, the logarithm of positive outpatient and
inpatient expenditures by 20−30%, while the positive pharmaceutical expenditures decrease
the least. Altogether, the expenditure categories remain 2 − 3 times higher in the medium
term compared to two years prior to claiming disability benefit.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Using individual level administrative panel data from Hungary, we analysed the effect of job
loss on disability benefit uptake and its relationship with health expenditures. To establish
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year Probability of positive
since outpatient inpatient drugs
disability coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E.
–2 −0.140∗∗∗ (0.012) −0.332∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.139∗∗∗ (0.013)
–1 −0.030∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.008 (0.020) −0.032∗∗∗ (0.009)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
+1 −0.055∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.179∗∗∗ (0.018) −0.039∗∗∗ (0.009)
+2 −0.069∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.218∗∗∗ (0.023) −0.057∗∗∗ (0.013)
+3 −0.098∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.213∗∗∗ (0.029) −0.054∗∗∗ (0.017)
Note: Average probabilities at year 0
0 0.985 0.658 0.958
year Logarithm of positive
since outpatient inpatient drugs
disability coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E.
–2 −1.239∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.583∗∗∗ (0.080) −1.138∗∗∗ (0.062)
–1 −0.124∗∗ (0.048) 0.070 (0.061) −0.409∗∗∗ (0.047)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
+1 −0.316∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.224∗∗∗ (0.064) −0.121∗∗∗ (0.042)
+2 −0.283∗∗∗ (0.052) −0.255∗∗∗ (0.081) −0.104∗ (0.055)
+3 −0.237∗∗∗ (0.072) −0.213∗∗ (0.098) −0.102 (0.072)
Note: Average logarithms at year 0
0 10.66 12.78 11.26
Number of individuals: 1,290
Number of person-years: 5,879
Cluster-robust standard errors (S.E.), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Individual fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects included.
Table 3: Event study analysis of health expenditures around the uptake of disability benefit
(t = 0 denotes the year of first claiming disability benefit)
the causal effects of job loss, we made use of mass lay-offs, and matched laid-off individuals
to non-laid-off workers with similar employment and health history. We then examined the
uptake of disability benefits and health expenditures on the matched sample.
According to our results, job loss implies a 50−100% increase in the transition to disability
insurance in 2 − 4 years. The large and statistically significant effects are in line with the
conclusions of related studies from Norway (in between the effects estimated by Bratsberg
et al., 2013 and Rege et al., 2009). To our knowledge, our study is the first that explicitly
analyses the time-varying patterns of the transition rates. We obtain that around half of the
excess transitions to disability occur within the first year, and transition rates become very
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similar in the laid-off and control groups after three years.
Our models indicate that the effect of job loss on disability insurance utilisation is stronger
among those in worse health. In addition, we found that the uptake of disability benefit after
a job loss is associated with a surge in health expenditures. Compared to two years prior to
claiming disability benefit, health expenditures increase 3.5 − 4 times, and start to decline
afterwards but remain elevated in the medium term (at 2 − 3 times the original values).
Altogether, the additional health expenditure as a share of annual disability payments reaches
40% in the first year of disability and 20− 25% in the medium term.8
We have no information on the health status of the individuals; thus we cannot conclude
on the causes behind the surge in health expenditure. In principle, the worsening health
status, the diagnosis of previously undetected chronic diseases, or unnecessary healthcare
visits in order to cheat the disability system, may all lead to expenditure increase. However,
indirect evidence suggests that at least a substantial part of the surge is not due to a genuine
worsening of health status. First, half of the excess transitions occur within the first year, in
a time span when genuine health shocks are unlikely. Second, although the 3.5−4-fold surge
in health expenditure seems large at first sight, its pattern, in fact, resembles that observed at
the diagnosis of chronic diseases, such as diabetes or hypertension, with a somewhat smaller
(two-fold – three-fold) increase. Based on individual-level administrative data, Appendix D
shows event study results of the outpatient and inpatient expenditures around the time of
diagnosis of selected chronic diseases in the 35− 54-years old age group.
Overall, our results indicate large causal effects of job loss on disability insurance use,
8Compared to two years prior to claiming disability benefit, health expenditures are higher by 370 thou-
sand HUF in the first year of disability insurance enrolment and by 220 thousand HUF two years later.
Meanwhile, the average annual disability benefit was 920 thousand HUF in the laid-off, disabled sample.
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which are, in turn, associated with substantial increases in health expenditures. Out of 100
laid-off workers, roughly 1.4 claim disability benefit due to the job loss within four years of
the lay-off. Compared to the pre-lay-off health expenditure levels, these individuals more
than triple their annual health expenditure. These findings point to the importance of
ensuring employment possibilities to workers affected by mass lay-offs. Otherwise, disability
benefits serve as a substitute for employment which increases public expenditure not only
due to benefit payments, but also due to the higher public health expenditure of the benefit
claimants.
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Appendix
A Propensity score matching, balance plot
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Figure A1: Histograms of the propensity scores (linear predictions after logit model)
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B Effect of mass lay-off on labour market indicators
Log monthly earnings
at 2 years at 4 years
in (matched) control group 11.6306 11.6279
in (matched) laid-off group 11.5729 11.5418
difference (with SE) −0.0577∗∗∗ (0.0087) −0.0861∗∗∗ (0.0129)
Number of observations 39,808 17,944
Employment probabilities
at 2 years at 4 years
in (matched) control group 0.8386 0.7640
in (matched) laid-off group 0.6580 0.6570
difference (with SE) −0.1806∗∗∗ (0.0037) −0.1370∗∗∗ (0.0057)
Number of observations 53,201 25,846
Unemployment probabilities
at 2 years at 4 years
in (matched) control group 0.0650 0.0755
in (matched) laid-off group 0.1228 0.1174
difference (with SE) 0.0578∗∗∗ (0.0025) 0.0419∗∗∗ (0.0037)
Number of observations 53,201 25,846
Probability of receipt of maternity benefits (females)
at 2 years at 4 years
in (matched) control group 0.0132 0.0116
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0154 0.0130
difference (with SE) 0.0022 (0.0015) 0.0014 (0.0020)
Number of observations 24,825 11,930
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table B1: Effect of job loss on earnings and labour force status
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C Alternative definitions of job loss
We check the robustness of the main results to the definition of job loss. The first alternative
measure is company closure, including early leavers. We treat a firm as a closing firm if it
existed in the past 12 months, but not afterwards, and at most 15% of its employees moved
on to the same employer after the closure. We follow those individuals who left the company
12 − 0 months before the closure. This might include some voluntary leavers, as well, who
are likely to transit to another job; not to unemployment or disability insurance.
The second measure is based on the Hungarian legal definition of collective redundancy.
It is defined when an employer makes at least 10 employees redundant from a firm with
20 − 99 employees; or makes at least 10% of the employees redundant from a firm with
100 − 299 employees; or makes at least 30 employees redundant from a firm with at least
300 employees. Again, we exclude those firms from which more than 15% of the employees
move on to the same employer after the redundancy.
Table C2 compares the probabilities of receiving disability benefit in the alternative laid-
off groups to their control groups chosen with propensity score matching.
Disability insurance probabilities
at 2 years at 4 years
after firm closure and early leavers
in (matched) control group 0.0124 0.0275
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0190 0.0375
difference (with SE) 0.0066∗∗∗ (0.0013) 0.0099∗∗∗ (0.0023)
Number of observations 51,640 32,413
after collective redundancy
in (matched) control group 0.0096 0.0200
in (matched) laid-off group 0.0212 0.0249
difference (with SE) 0.0116∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.0049∗∗∗ (0.0005)
Number of observations 204,250 100,473
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table C2: Probabilities of disability insurance enrolment, other definitions of job loss
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D Patterns of health expenditures at the diagnosis of
selected chronic diseases
We illustrate the effect of the diagnosis of selected chronic diseases on health expenditures
using an individual level administrative panel dataset, which contains detailed information
on outpatient and inpatient events (but not on labour market status) for the population of
20 selected micro-regions of Hungary: about 500, 000 people, for years 2008 − 2015. The
data was provided by the Hungarian National Healthcare Services Centre (A´EEK) originally
for the programme evaluation study presented in Elek et al. [2015], where further details on
the sample can be found. Here we use the control micro-regions of that study. These rural
micro-regions are not representative for the whole country, but we believe that the dataset
still gives information about the patterns of health expenditures around the diagnosis of
chronic diseases.
We define the year of diagnosis of diabetes or hypertension as the first year, when the
corresponding ICD-10 code (E10–E14 for diabetes and I10 for hypertension) appears in the
outpatient or inpatient records. We then conduct an event study analysis in the same way
as in equation (1).
The results on outpatient and inpatient care are reported in Table D3 (pharmaceutical
spending is not included in the dataset). The probability of hospitalisation, the probability
of receiving outpatient care and the amount of non-zero outpatient care all follow similar
patterns as observed around the first disability benefit receipt in Table 3: they increase
substantially before and fall moderately after the diagnosis of diabetes or hypertension.
The probability of positive outpatient, as well as the inpatient expenditures increases by
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15 − 30% points around the time of diagnosis, compared to the preceding two years, and
fall by 10− 25% points afterwards. The amount of outpatient spending increases by 0.9 log
point and then falls by 0.3− 0.5 log point. Combining the extensive and intensive margins;
i.e. the changes in the probability and in the logarithms of non-zero expenditures, we obtain
a more than two-fold increase in inpatient and a 3.5-fold increase in outpatient expenditures,
which are smaller than the changes at the time of disability receipt, but still substantial in
magnitude.
Diagnosis of diabetes
year Probability of positive Logarithm of positive
since outpatient inpatient outpatient inpatient
diagnosis coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E.
–2 −0.312∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.190∗∗∗ (0.009) −0.912∗∗∗ (0.028) −0.220∗∗∗ (0.065)
–1 −0.270∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.174∗∗∗ (0.009) −0.771∗∗∗ (0.027) −0.170∗∗∗ (0.053)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+1 −0.118∗∗∗ (0.007) −0.117∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.363∗∗∗ (0.026) −0.015 (0.053)
+2 −0.153∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.137∗∗∗ (0.012) −0.333∗∗∗ (0.033) −0.013 (0.064)
+3 −0.164∗∗∗ (0.012) −0.137∗∗∗ (0.014) −0.277∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.021 (0.084)
Note: Average values at year 0
0 1.000 0.344 9.82 12.05
Number of people diagnosed: 3,622
Number of person-years: 18,356
Diagnosis of hypertension
year Probability of positive Logarithm of positive
since outpatient inpatient outpatient inpatient
diagnosis coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E. coeff. S.E.
–2 −0.306∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.166∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.899∗∗∗ (0.013) −0.236∗∗∗ (0.032)
–1 −0.269∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.150∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.831∗∗∗ (0.012) −0.222∗∗∗ (0.029)
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
+1 −0.189∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.108∗∗∗ (0.004) −0.498∗∗∗ (0.013) −0.059∗∗ (0.032)
+2 −0.209∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.106∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.520∗∗∗ (0.016) −0.073∗∗ (0.037)
+3 −0.229∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.111∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.455∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.056 (0.049)
Note: Average values at year 0
0 0.999 0.298 9.74 12.07
Number of people diagnosed: 17,300
Number of person-years: 88,032
Cluster-robust standard errors (SE), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sample: 35-54 years old population of the control micro-regions of Elek et al. [2015]
Individual fixed effects and calendar year fixed effects included.
Table D3: Event study analysis of health expenditures around the diagnosis of diabetes and
hypertension
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